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1 Introduction
A standard assumption in economics is that individuals maximize their well-
being regardless of other people’s preferences. The necessary condition for
utility maximization implies that individual marginal benefits equal individ-
ual marginal costs. This condition equally applies to private goods as well
as public goods in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the
private provision of public goods leads to underprovision and efficiency losses
in comparison to the social optimum. The social optimum is characterized by
the well-known Samuelson (1954) condition, according to which the sum of
individual marginal benefits must equal marginal costs. However, Samuelson
(1954, p. 388) conjectured it would be impossible to implement this condition
by voluntary private contributions as described by the Lindahl equilibrium
(1919); in the absence of the possibility to exclude economic agents from
the consumption of the public good, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
allocation would be the more likely outcome of private provision.
In this paper, we investigate with laboratory data the question whether
private public goods provision is inefficient. More specifically, we test whether
the Nash equilibrium can account for the observed behavior better than the
Lindahl solution, as supposed by Samuelson (1954). We also check whether
the valuation of private goods in terms of willingness-to-pay (WTP) and the
valuation of public goods in terms of voluntary contributions correlate. A
high correlation between both measures would indicate that people essen-
tially orient their contributions to the public good towards the individual
consumption value of the private good. Hence, private good valuations could
be used as proxies for public good valuations. On the other hand, a low
correlation would indicate that revealed public good preferences are mainly
governed by other motives like free-riding incentives, social preferences, etc.
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The economic experiment that we designed for this purpose involves the
reduction of waiting time as the good to be valued in a within-subjects set-
ting. First, subjects reveal their preferences for private waiting-time reduc-
tion in a second-price auction. Then they decide on a voluntary contribution
towards public waiting-time reduction in a public-goods game. Both tasks
involve salient rewards. We use the revealed private good preferences (WTP)
to predict the Nash and the Lindahl equilibrium contributions, respectively,
and compare them to their actual contributions to public waiting-time re-
duction. Our results contradict Samuelson’s (1954) conjecture, since the ob-
served level of public waiting-time reduction is close to the predicted group
optimum. It significantly exceeds the Nash equilibrium prediction. However,
for a majority of subjects the Lindahl equilibrium is not able to predict the
observed contributions. Moreover, we find a significant positive correlation
between private good and public good valuations, but with the qualification
that the correlation is distinctly lower than one. Hence, the private good
valuation of waiting time reduction is only an imperfect indicator of public
good valuation.
In recent years, a considerable body of literature on other-regarding pref-
erences has emerged that allows for such differences in the valuation of public
and private goods, for example, the contributions on reciprocity (see Fehr and
Schmidt, 2003; and Sobel, 2005, for literature surveys), on impure altruism
and the “warm glow of giving” (Andreoni, 1990), and on errors in decision
making (see Andreoni, 1995; Anderson et al., 1998). Although the issue
taken up in this paper, whether public and private goods are substitutes, has
not really been explored so far, it has been questioned. For instance, List
and Shogren (1998) highlighted that “future research should explore whether
private goods can serve as reasonable proxies for public preferences” (p. 203).
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Shogren (2006), who surveyed the literature on public good valuation, did not
cite any study that directly tries to contrast non-hypothetical valuations for
public and private goods. As the sole author, Bohm (1972) experimentally
studied the issue in his seminal paper on experimental public good valua-
tion, yet on the basis of hypothetical questions.1 Thus, our laboratory study
seems to fill a gap. That such a gap should exist is astonishing in the light
of a huge body of literature on public good valuations having been created
during the last decades.
Due to missing market data, most of the empirical public good valuations
today are based on the contingent valuation method. One of the major
critique points against this approach (Hausman, 1993) has been that this
method relies on replies to hypothetical questions. Economists generally
doubt that people truthfully state their preferences when nothing is at stake
(for a recent discussion see Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Another important
approach to empirical public goods valuations has involved hedonic pricing
(Palmquist and Smith, 2002, survey the literature) which can only indirectly
elicit preferences by making use of market data.
An important alternative to empirical research is laboratory research,
which allows direct and non-hypothetical elicitation of preferences by making
use of salient rewards. A significant laboratory institution for the valuation
of public goods is the Smith Auction (Smith, 1980). In Smith’s experiments,
subjects formed collectives of size 3, 6, or 9. Previously, they had been
assigned to three different parameter classes involving different money en-
dowments and payoff functions. The classes were evenly distributed within
1Bohm (1972) referred that, regardless of the share subjects had to pay of their stated
willingness to pay for a public good, they would always report the same amount. The
issue of private good valuation was addressed in one hypothetical question in which the
offered good was supplied at zero costs.
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the groups. Subjects submitted a 2–tuple sealed bid consisting of a maximal
contribution and a quantity proposal to the provision of a public good. The
mean proposed quantity was computed and produced if the sum of contribu-
tions weakly exceeded its production costs. If more contributions were raised
than needed, a proportional rebate rule applied. Smith reported that his “ex-
perimental results support a slight over-provision of public goods relative to
the Lindahl optimum. However, individual bids do not support Lindahl opti-
mal bids. . . ” (p. 598). Much of the more recent experimental work on public
goods has focused on the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) (Isaac
et al., 1984), which is a symmetric linear game in which subjects decide on
a contribution towards a public good only.2 In the standard VCM, the Nash
equilibrium implies zero contributions, and the Lindahl equilibrium alloca-
tion implies contribution of the entire endowment (see Hey, 1991; Davis and
Holt, 1993; Ledyard, 1995; Keser, 2002, for literature surveys). Observed
contributions in the one-shot game spread from zero to the full endowment
averaging between 40% and 60% of the group optimum. The Smith Auction
and VCM directly elicit preferences for public goods only; they induce the
relative valuation for private goods. Moreover, all goods in these experimen-
tal institutions are represented by monetary payoffs. In contrast to these
approaches, our study involves a tradeoff between private monetary payoffs
and a real public good, namely, waiting time reduction. Our design therefore
is a rather accurate implementation of Samuelson’s (1954) pure theory of
public expenditure.
Compared to other goods that have been valued in the field and in the lab-
2However, more recent experimental research also involves non-linear payoff functions
(for example, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; see Laury and Holt, 2008, for a literature
survey).
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oratory (Harrison and List, 2004; Shogren, 2006), waiting time reduction can
be implemented in the laboratory very inexpensively. Beyond being cheap for
the experimenter in monetary terms, waiting time has an important dimen-
sion in the supply of services and goods, public ones as well as private ones.
Most goods and services are not instantaneously available as their allocation
causes waiting time for the demander. Waiting time can affect the life, the
health and the welfare of citizens. A public institution such as the army, po-
lice, fire brigade, public health system3 or public jurisdictional system4 must
be prepared to effectively serve the citizen in need in a reasonable amount
of time.5 In the private sector, waiting time for customers is crucial for a
firm’s success as it affects its turnover and the satisfaction of its customers.6
For its importance in an economy, waiting time can be viewed at least from
two different angles: from the individual’s (the micro-) perspective, waiting
time is a private bad; from the society’s (the macro-) perspective, waiting
time is a public bad. Conversely, the reduction of waiting time for demanded
3Waiting times for health care are a significant issue in many countries. Governments
provide huge funding for a reduction, and patients with high waiting costs choose private
treatment. Much research has been dedicated to estimating the induced welfare loss (Cullis
et al., 2000, survey the literature).
4Vereeck and Mu¨hl (2000, p. 243) report data from Belgium where “court delay has
proven to be a serious political problem of national importance. . . The situation is partic-
ularly dramatic though improving in the Courts of Appeal, where the average court delay
in the last decade was over 6 years.”
5The effectiveness of any service institution to managing clients’ waiting time depends
on the quantity and quality of its workforce, on its subsidiary locations, and on production
capacities (for example, beds in public hospitals).
6This issue is of general importance. Waiting for food, transport, or for the referee
reports from a submission to an academic journal are just some examples for the impact
of waiting time on utility. Private waiting time plays a particularly important role for
drug addicts (Kirby and Petry, 2004).
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services and commodities is a good as it increases welfare.
So far, only a small number of laboratory experiments in the literature
involved decisions about waiting time. Hartman (2007) estimated from a
road congestion experiment that his student subjects had average valuations
of (waiting) time of between $10 and $18 per hour. In an experimental
investigation of time preferences, Kroll and Vogt (2008) found that waiting
time was perceived as a loss and that subjects behaved risk seeking with
respect to risky waiting time decisions. Kroll and Vogt (2009) studied the St.
Petersburg Paradox in an experimental setup where subjects were endowed
with waiting time instead of money.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the
experimental design. Thereafter, in Section 3, we discuss the theoretical
benchmarks of social optimum and Nash equilibrium. In the fourth section,
the experimental results are reported and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Experimental Design
We report the results of 4 hand-run, two-part experimental sessions con-
ducted at the University of Hannover, Germany. In each part, subjects were
endowed with e 15 and 1 hour of waiting time. The two parts were separated
by a week. Subjects earned an average of e 25.59 (e 1'$1.30). We elicited
the individual demand for waiting time reduction as a private good by means
of a second price sealed bid auction (first part) and as a public good in the
second part.7
7Note that all subjects first took part in the auction and then participated in the public
good experiment. In order to minimize potential order effects and to accustom subjects
to the object of the study, waiting was practised by all subjects before the first part of the
experiment started (see below).
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2.1 Eliciting Private Good Valuations
Value elicitation by second-price auctions is the standard approach in exper-
imental research on non-induced values (Shogren, 2006). The second price
sealed bid auction (of the first part) involved simultaneous multiple-unit bid-
ding. Each subject i had to submit a bid bti for each of four possible waiting
time reductions of t = 60, 45, 30, and 15 minutes, knowing that she could
acquire only one reduction. Bids were required to be weakly decreasing and
were restrained to the interval of e [0.00;15.00]. Submission of bids indi-
cating Eurocents rather than only Euros was strongly encouraged (see the
Instructions in the Appendix A). Once the bids were collected, 60 minutes
waiting time reduction were assigned to the high bidder at the second highest
bid. In case of a tie, the winner was determined by chance among the high
bidders. The winners’ bids for all subsequent auctions were canceled. Fol-
lowing the same procedure, 45 minutes, 30 minutes and finally 15 minutes of
waiting time reduction were assigned to the high bidder among the remaining
subjects. All other subjects were assigned no waiting time reduction.
As subjects might have perceived the four different waiting time reduc-
tions as (imperfect) substitutes, which would imply downward-biased bids,
we also computed corrected bids b˜ti for each subject according to the formula
b˜ti = b
t
i/[(N −K +1)/(N − kt+1)], where N denotes the number of subjects
attending the auction, K = 4 is the number of auctioned waiting time re-
ductions, and (k60 = 1), . . . , (k15 = 4), the respective auction stage (see, for
example, Neugebauer, 2004). We performed all computations and statistical
test reported in Section 3 with benefit function estimated both, from the
original and the corrected bids. Since there were no qualitative differences
between them, we decided to report only the output resting upon the original
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data.8 Furthermore, we have to acknowledge the well-documented tendency
for overbidding in second-price auctions. While the “substitution bias” may
have led to a lower willingness-to-pay, overbidding may have led to a higher
willingness-to-pay as compared to the unknown true valuations. At the best,
both biases canceled out each other, which is a further reason for us to rely
on the original data.
2.2 Eliciting Public Good Valuations
The public goods game (of the second part) was one shot and subjects were
matched randomly (by manual draws from a hat) to groups of four. In case
the number of participants in a session was not a multiple of 4, the remaining
subjects formed a group, randomly completed by subjects from other groups,
in order to determine their payoffs. In the public goods game, the hour of
waiting time was assigned to a group, and not to an individual as in the
auction. Every subject was asked to privately make a contribution of ecacti ,
cacti ∈ [0.00, 15.00], to the reduction in group waiting time. Two limiting
cases were possible: If a group collected e 0.00 (e 30.00) for the reduction
in group waiting time, every group member had to wait 60 (0) minutes.
If the group collected more than e 30, the surplus was proportionally re-
bated (Smith, 1980).9 Thus, a subject’s contribution was 30cacti /
∑
cactj if∑
cactj > 30 and c
act
i otherwise.
10
8The output for the corrected data is available from the authors on request.
9A proportional rebate rule was also applied by Isaac et al. (1989) (but only in case
contributions fell short of a threshold). For alternative rebate rules in public goods exper-
iments see Marks and Croson (1998).
10In the experiment, no group’s contribution exceeded the threshold level of e 30: the
maximum was e 27. Hence, the rebate rule did not have to be applied. Apart from that,
Marks and Croson (1998) showed that introducing a proportional rebate rule does not
9
Regarding group waiting time reduction, we considered two treatments:
In the first treatment, the marginal cost of a minute in group waiting time
reduction was held constant at e 0.5. In the second treatment, the marginal
cost of the t’th minute in waiting time reduction was et/61, t ∈ [0, 60]
(1/61 ×∑60t=1 t = 30). Seconds were averaged out; e.g., a group would be
allocated a waiting time reduction of 24 minutes and 12 seconds for e 5.
We refer to the first treatment as the constant marginal costs treatment
(ConstMC) and to the second as the increasing marginal costs treatment
(IncrMC) in the following.
As to the linear “production” of the public good, the ConstMC treatment
resembles the standard VCM, which alleviates comparison of the results.
Furthermore, due to its linearity the relationship between individual contri-
bution and group waiting time reduction is easily conceived by the subjects.
The ConstMC treatment, however, has the disadvantage that for subjects
with non-decreasing marginal utility of waiting time reduction, there exists
no Lindahl equilibrium (see below). Hence, we decided to design a second
treatment, which due to the more complicated cost structure requires more
computational effort of our subjects, but is immune to the problem of non-
decreasing marginal utility.
Costs of waiting time reduction were presented to subjects in a table indi-
cating, in discrete steps of one minute, reduction in waiting time, remaining
waiting time and expenses (see Appendix B). In both parts, subjects were
accompanied to a lecture hall after their waiting time reduction had been
determined. There they were seated at numbered places and were asked to
wait silently under supervision until the experimenter would indicate the end
of the waiting time. While waiting they were not allowed to read, talk, sleep,
change the efficient group outcome.
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drink, eat or pursue any other activity whatsoever.
In order to prepare subjects for the task and to help them to price the
time accurately, waiting was practiced during the instructional session of
the first part for 5 minutes before any decision was taken. The first and
the second part were scheduled at the same time on the same weekday, the
second part being one week later. By enrolling for one session, subjects
committed to participate in both parts. At the beginning of the first part,
each subject received an identification number indicating the seats to be
taken during the experiment. Instructions (see Appendix A) were read aloud,
possible questions were answered, record sheets were filled in and results were
calculated. After the second part they were paid privately.
2.3 Benefit Functions
Let y denote subjects i’s initial endowment (that is, the e 15 given to her at
the beginning of the experiment) and bti her true valuation of a t minutes’
waiting time reduction, that is, the benefit of being allowed to leave the
waiting room earlier than after 60 minutes measured in monetary terms.
bti is the willingness-to-pay for a quantity change in waiting time reduction
(from zero to t). It can be expressed by means of a money-metric indirect
utility function µi(t|0, y), where µi is the amount of income required to keep
the subject on the same level of utility as in (0, y) if waiting time reduction
is changed from zero to t: bti = µi(0|0, y) − µi(t|0, y) with µi(0|0, y) ≡ y
(see Randall and Stoll, 1980). As explained above, in the experiment, bti was
assessed for four values of t: 15, 30, 45, and 60 minutes.
The unknown “true” benefit function is estimated using a second-order
Taylor approximation under the assumption that the benefit from a zero
minutes’ waiting time reduction is zero, that is, b0i = 0. Given these five
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points, we estimate
bti = αit+ βit
2 + εi (1)
for every subject, where εi denotes an error term. The subject’s estimated
benefit function and marginal benefit function are then given by
b̂i(t) = αˆit+ βˆit
2 (2)
and
m̂bi(t) = αˆi + 2βˆit , (3)
respectively.
More elaborate alternatives to the quadratic equation (2) are conceiv-
able,11 yet it exhibits several advantages for our purpose. First, setting the
quadratic term equal to zero would be equivalent to the assumption that
there is no income effect. In this case, the coefficient αˆ could simply be in-
terpreted as the ratio of constant marginal utility of the good and marginal
utility of income (Morey and Rossmann, 2003, p. 3), transforming minutes of
waiting time reduction into monetary units. Hence, for every subject, we can
test on income effects by estimating (1) and checking for significance of βˆ.
Second, both concave and convex shapes of the benefit function are possible.
Third, having estimated (1), it is relatively easy to calculate closed-form solu-
tions for the individual and social optima. Note that we require subjects to be
weakly non-saturated in waiting time reduction over the full range t ∈ [0, 60],
that is, we impose the ex ante restrictions αˆi ≥ 0 and αˆi + 120βˆi ≥ 0 on our
subjects’ preferences.12
11For a theoretical treatment of deriving closed-form solutions for compensating vari-
ations with price and quantity changes see Morey and Rossmann (2003). See also the
references stated therein, in particular Johnson and Desvousges (1997).
12Initially, 18 subjects violated either condition. Re-estimating equation (1) with the
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2.4 Payoff Functions
Let ci denote subject i’s actual contribution to public waiting time reduction,
where the sum of contributions equals the production cost of the public good:
C =
∑
i ci. In the ConstMC treatment, the money equivalent payoff function
of a subject is as follows:
pii = 15− ci + αˆi × 2
∑
j
cj + βˆi ×
(
2
∑
j
cj
)2
. (4)
The equation allows us to highlight the differences between our design and
the standard linear voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). Here, the
marginal return of the public good is 2 ×
(
αˆi + 2βˆi
∑
j cj
)
. In contrast to
the present design, in the standard VCM the valuation of the public good is
ex-ante restricted to be linear and does not depend on the size of the public
good (βˆi = 0 ∀ i)13, and the parameter αˆi = α ∀ i is induced by the exper-
imenter rather than elicited as in the first part of our experiment. In the
standard VCM, the public good would thus yield a marginal return of 2×α,
which is usually called the marginal per capita return (Isaac et al., 1984),
and the income effect would be neglected.
Analogously, in the IncrMC treatment the payoff function is given by
pii = 15− ci + αˆi ×
(
120
∑
j
cj
)0.5
+ βˆi × 120
∑
j
cj . (5)
Accordingly, the marginal return of the public good is given by
√
30αˆi(
∑
j cj)
−0.5 + 120βˆi. It depends on the size of the public good even
ex-ante restriction βi = 0, i.e., linearizing the benefit function, resulted in αˆi > 0 and an
adequate fit for all of these cases. Hence, none of these subjects had to be excluded from
the analysis.
13Laury and Holt (2008) survey the literature on nonlinear VCMs. For example, An-
dreoni (1993) used the logarithms of the private and the public good, respectively, in the
payoff function.
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if there is no income effect: the marginal return unambiguously drops as
the public good becomes relatively more expensive (the sum of contributions
increases). Note that in the ConstMC treatment this effect could be positive
(for positive βˆ), zero (βˆ = 0) or negative (βˆ < 0).
2.5 Theoretical Benchmarks
Using the above stated payoff functions it is straightforward to calculate
the respective theoretical “predictions” for the subjects’ contribution to the
public good according to the Samuelson condition, in the Lindahl equilib-
rium, and in the Nash equilibrium, respectively. Since the computations are
lengthly and involve many different special cases, we omit the details and
give only an intuitive description here.14 Note that we deal with both the
Lindahl equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium in a purely normative sense.
The experiment did neither involve a social planner who sets individualized
marginal prices in such a way that every subject in the group has an incentive
to demand his or her efficient quantity of waiting time reduction in terms
of the Lindahl solution. Nor did the subjects know the distributions of the
other subjects’ preference parameters or even their exact values. Hence, we
cannot guarantee that the Nash equilibrium or the Lindahl equilibrium are
the right descriptive models of subjects’ behavior even if our test procedure
detects compliance between our data and one of the predictions. Rather, by
theoretical prediction we mean that we estimate for each of our subjects the
Nash and Lindahl equilibria as if they have had the necessary information
on the other subjects’ preferences.
The efficient solution corresponding to the Samuelson condition is com-
puted by adding the payoff functions of the four group members and solving
14The formulae are available from the authors on request.
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the first derivative with respect to C for Copt. Plugging the result back into
the individual benefit function yields the Lindahl contribution copti . How-
ever, for the quadruple {copti : i = 1, . . . , 4} to be an equilibrium also the
second-order condition for an individual net-benefit (excess of benefit over
contribution) maximum has to be satisfied for each group member. To be
able to evaluate the theory, we have to exclude from the individual analysis
the data of those subjects whose net-benefit functions are inconsistent with
the concave shape assumption. Since about half of the subjects participat-
ing in the ConstMC treatment exhibited convex marginal net-benefit, the
Lindahl solution was only computed for the IncrMC treatment, where this
problem did not occur due to the convexity of the cost function.
In the ConstMC treatment, for the ease of computations, we set the exper-
imental marginal costs parameter relatively high (0.5) to ensure that individ-
ual marginal benefits would never exceed marginal costs. Hence, in the Nash
equilibrium no subject was willing to contribute. In the IncrMC treatment,
we made use of the fact that no subject exhibited estimated marginal benefits
high enough to spend her entire endowment on waiting time reduction. The
maximum number of minutes a subject could afford would be 42.43, given
an initial endowment of e 15. The 43rd minute would involve marginal costs
of e 0.71. This amount is much higher than the highest marginal evaluation
of waiting time reduction by any subject, which was e 0.35. Hence, in each
group only one subject—the one exhibiting the highest marginal benefits—
will make a positive contribution in the Nash equilibrium. For all other group
members contributions should be zero.
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3 Results
Our analysis rests on a sample of 87 subjects, 44 of which participated
in the ConstMC treatment and 43 of which were assigned to the IncrMC
treatment.15 The data analysis involves both between-subjects and within-
subjects comparison based on the responses recorded in the first and the
second part of the experiment.
3.1 Are Lindahl and Nash Equilibrium Predictions Good
Descriptions of Observed Group Behavior?
In Table 1, we report the results of the group analysis for both treatments,
ConstMC and IncrMC. The table lists the medians of (i) the actual group
contributions and the corresponding waiting time reductions, (ii) the op-
timum group contributions and waiting time reductions according to the
Samuelson condition, and (iii) the Nash equilibrium contributions and wait-
ing time reductions (being always zero for the ConstMC treatment). 95%
and 99% confidence intervals for the median are stated at the right side of
the table. We used medians rather than means in order to immunize our test
results against outliers and non-normality of the underlying distributions.
Furthermore, for each treatment, we conducted tests on the equality of (iv)
actual and optimum contributions and (v) actual and Nash contributions.
The respective test results can also be taken from the table, where one lead-
ing asterisk means that a test was significant at the 5% level and two leading
asterisks mean that the test was significant at the 1% level.
15Actually, 95 subjects participated in the first part. Seven subjects did not show up
in the second part, one subject had to be disqualified for leaving the experiment without
waiting.
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Table 1 Results of Group Analysis
Median Confidence Intervals for C
C Euros t (minutes) 95% 99%
ConstMC Treatment
(i) actual 12.08 24 [8.54, 15.58] [7.31, 16.63]
(ii) optimal 0.00 0 [0.00, 10.32] [0.00, 15.97]
(iii) Nash 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Tests:
(iv) actual−optimal 6.10 12.20 [−0.86, 11.65] [−4.42, 13.28]
(v) actual−Nash **12.08 24 [8.54, 15.58] [7.31, 16.63]
IncrMC Treatment
(i) actual 13.46 40 [9.62, 17.22] [8.36, 18.33]
(ii) optimal 7.13 29 [5.02, 9.81] [4.43, 10.88]
(iii) Nash 1.84 14 [1.40, 1.88] [1.06, 1.88]
Tests:
(iv) actual−optimal *4.62 8 [0.54, 8.50] [−0.29, 9.69]
(v) actual−Nash **11.32 25 [7.45, 15.07] [6.05, 16.23]
Table note. Confidence intervals for the median based on 10.000 random
samples of 11 (10) groups each. Tests are two-tailed (*:p ≤ 0.05, **:p ≤
0.01); H0: the medians are equal.
Remember that (i) subjects were randomly matched into groups of four,
(ii) anonymity was kept throughout the experiment, and (iii) we used a one-
shot design of the group experiment. Since the actual groups that led to the
payoffs of subjects were arbitrarily matched, we cannot take it for granted
that the resulting group decisions and normative benchmarks are represen-
tative for the sample. Hence, confidence intervals and tests were computed
using Monte Carlo simulation as follows. In the ConstMC (IncrMC) case,
each simulation-run involved the data of 44 (40) subjects. In the former case,
there were exactly 44 subjects. In the IncrMC case, however, there were 43
subjects. So, 40 of the 43 subjects had to be preselected randomly in the
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first step of the simulation procedure. The 44 (40) subjects were randomly
assigned to 11 (10) groups of 4 subjects in the second step. Then, for each
group separately, the actual, optimum, and Nash contributions and waiting
time reductions, respectively, and the differences between these quantities
were computed. Randomness in the data (measurement error, noise, etc.)
was taken into account by adding a normally distributed random variable
with zero mean and variance
∑
j SEE
2
j to the differences, where SEEj is the
standard estimation error of estimating the benefit function (1) for subject j.
In the fourth step, the median across the eight groups was determined. This
four-step procedure was repeated 10,000 times.16 Accordingly, the lower and
upper bound of the 95% (99%) confidence interval are given by the 250th
(50th) smallest and the 250th (50th) largest observation, respectively.17
We comment on the ConstMC treatment first. The median of actual
group contributions is e 12.08, corresponding to a reduction in waiting time
by 24 minutes. As can be taken from the table, the variation of group contri-
butions is relatively low, ranging between some e 7.31 and e 16.63 according
to the 99% confidence interval. In contrast to this, we get large confidence in-
tervals for the group optima, ranging from zero up to e 15.97, however, with a
median of e 0. This reflects the large heterogeneity of individual preferences
with regard to waiting time reduction. Note that a median of e 0 means that
for more than 50% of the random samples, the optimum group contribution
would have been zero, that is, the sum of marginal benefits did not exceed
the marginal costs of 50 Eurocents per minute. As noted in Section 3.2, the
16Neglecting the first step, the number of possible permutations is quite large:
44!/(11! 4!11) = 4.4× 1031.
17In simulating a large number of group compositions, this test procedure allows for the
fact that in our non-induced values framework subjects did not know their group members’
preferences.
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Nash equilibrium is characterized by zero group contributions.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the actual contributions are
equal to the optimum contributions, since the 95% confidence interval con-
tains both negative and positive differences. The median difference of e 6.10
is not significantly different from zero. The equality of actual and Nash con-
tributions, however, is strongly rejected by our data, the difference of e 12.08
being significant at the 1% level.
For the IncrMC treatment, we observe actual group contributions of
e 13.46, corresponding to a waiting time reduction by 40 minutes. Optimal
group contributions amount to e 7.13 Euros (29 minutes). Since marginal
costs increased from zero to one Euro per minute, the median Nash contribu-
tion is larger than zero (e 1.84 or 14 minutes). In contrast to the ConstMC
treatment, testing on the equality of actual and optimum contributions does
now reject the null hypothesis that actual contributions are equal to the
optimum contributions, though only at the 5% level.
It might appear worthwhile to study the welfare implications of our sub-
jects’ contribution behavior. The ConstMC is less suitable for this undertak-
ing as the median optimum and Nash contributions did not differ from zero
for most groups. Hence, we concentrate on the IncrMC treatment. We com-
pare median group welfare in the social optimum, in the Nash equilibrium,
and according to actual group contributions with one another by comput-
ing their respective ratios. Welfare is computed as the sum of the group
members’ monetary payoff functions, where either the optimum, the Nash,
or the actual group contribution is plugged into equation (5). In the Nash
equilibrium, group welfare reached 97.4% of the maximum determined by the
Samuelson condition. The respective 5% and 1% confidence intervals for the
median are given by [96.0; 98.4] and [95.5; 98.6], respectively. Actual group
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welfare did only slightly but insignificantly exceed the Nash equilibrium (me-
dian: 100.8%, confidence intervals: [98.4; 102.7] and [97.4; 103.4]) and turned
out to be significantly lower than the possible maximum (median: 98.3%,
confidence intervals: [95.9; 99.6] and [95; 99.8]). Hence, because at least 95%
of the (hypothetical) groups overcontributed as compared to the social op-
timum (see Table 1), a significant welfare loss resulted that was comparable
in size to the welfare loss implied by pure Nash behavior.
To summarize, in both treatments subjects contributed significantly more
than our first normative benchmark, the Nash equilibrium. In fact, group
contributions were higher (in the IncrMC treatment even significantly higher)
as our second normative benchmark, the social optimum; that is, higher as
in the induced value framework, where subjects contribute about half of the
social optimum. In the next subsection, we explore the structure of individual
contributions.
3.2 Are Lindahl and Nash Equilibrium Predictions Good
Descriptions of Observed Individual Behavior?
As explained in Section 3.2, it is only possible to compute the Lindahl equilib-
rium when the net-benefit functions are concave. In the ConstMC treatment
this applied only to 19 subjects. Therefore, we decided to conduct the indi-
vidual analysis only for the IncrMC treatment. Table 2 shows the results of
analyzing the individual data gained from the IncrMC treatment. Subject
numbers are given in the first column. In columns 2 to 5, we state the bids
bti for each subject for waiting time reductions of t = {60, 45, 30, 15} minutes
in the first part of the experiment. The next three columns show subject i’s
actual contribution cacti , her optimum contribution in the Lindahl equilib-
rium c
opt
i , and her contribution according to the Nash solution c
Nash
i in the
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second part of the experiment. The last row contains the respective mean
values across subjects.
The procedure of obtaining the optimum bid was as follows: At the
outset, one subject was selected. For the remaining 42 subjects, we ascer-
tained all possible permutations of groups of 3 subjects. There are exactly
42!/3!39! = 11, 480 such permutations. After merging the subject under in-
vestigation with each permutation, we calculated for each hypothetical group
the optimum waiting time reduction and contribution by accounting for the
estimated individual benefit functions. The Lindahl contribution of the sub-
ject was then compared to the actual contribution. This procedure was re-
peated for all 43 subjects. The figure in Table 2 is the median of the 11,480
individually optimal contributions of the respective subject. Analogously, we
obtained theoretical predictions for the contribution in the Nash equilibrium.
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Table 2 Results of Individual Analysis—IncrMC Treatment
bti, t = ci Test
No. 60 45 30 15 act opt Nash opt Nash
1 14.00 11.00 7.00 4.00 3.44 4.15 1.81 -0.72 **1.95
2 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 0.90 0.00 **2.10 **3.00
3 6.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 9.75 1.38 0.00 **8.34 **9.71
4 1.14 0.86 0.57 0.28 0.00 0.23 0.00 **-0.23 0.00
5 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.41 0.00 **-0.41 0.00
6 7.50 5.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 -2.04 0.00
7 15.00 10.00 7.50 5.00 5.75 4.29 1.89 1.40 **4.26
8 12.34 12.05 7.67 3.48 9.40 3.46 2.07 **6.03 **7.50
9 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.90 0.01 0.00 **0.89 **0.90
10 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 0.90 0.00 **2.10 **3.00
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 **6.00 **6.00
13 7.61 4.15 3.17 0.00 7.50 1.93 0.00 *5.47 **7.50
14 10.11 8.11 5.11 0.00 1.00 3.12 0.00 -2.35 0.89
15 6.00 3.75 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.37 0.00 **-1.38 -0.00
16 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 14.80 7.38 0.00 7.38 **14.78
17 3.50 3.00 2.50 1.00 0.90 0.82 0.00 -0.10 **0.88
18 6.00 5.00 4.00 2.00 0.25 1.44 0.00 **-1.17 0.19
19 15.00 10.00 10.00 2.00 0.50 4.44 1.94 -4.09 -1.11
20 3.51 3.09 1.51 0.51 0.50 0.80 0.00 -0.33 0.50
21 9.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.63 0.00 -1.73 -0.06
22 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 10.00 7.38 0.00 2.57 **9.99
23 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.41 0.00 **-0.41 0.00
24 15.00 11.25 7.50 3.75 3.44 4.64 1.88 -1.20 **1.57
25 15.00 11.25 7.50 3.75 6.20 4.64 1.88 1.56 **4.33
26 14.00 10.00 7.00 2.00 9.20 4.58 0.00 *4.56 **8.80
27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
28 2.03 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.00 -0.33 0.00
29 14.99 10.17 8.00 2.25 15.00 4.87 0.00 **10.02 **14.27
Table continues
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continuation of Table 2
bti, t = ci Test
No. 60 45 30 15 act opt Nash opt Nash
30 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 1.17 0.00 **-1.16 -0.06
31 3.52 3.11 2.50 1.83 1.90 0.81 0.00 **1.14 **1.87
32 4.50 3.80 2.14 0.56 0.00 1.06 0.00 *-1.08 -0.03
33 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.00 -0.66 -0.02
34 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 7.62 1.29 0.00 **6.38 **7.49
35 2.51 2.50 2.40 2.00 5.00 14.42 8.75 **-9.47 **-3.74
36 12.00 8.00 6.00 5.00 0.74 3.09 0.00 -2.36 0.20
37 10.00 8.00 7.00 5.00 12.03 2.32 1.70 **9.82 **11.12
38 2.50 2.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.50 0.00 *1.45 **2.00
39 3.63 2.01 1.93 1.01 2.80 0.75 0.00 **2.02 **2.80
40 7.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 1.77 0.00 **-1.78 -0.10
41 10.02 8.04 6.15 3.01 3.78 2.62 0.00 **1.17 **3.67
42 9.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 0.25 2.05 0.00 -1.70 -0.37
43 15.00 13.00 12.00 9.00 0.25 5.78 2.58 -5.74 -2.17
µ 7.27 5.38 3.81 1.71 3.42 2.46 0.57 0.93 2.83
Table notes. Median optimum and Nash contributions based on all 11,480
possible group permutations. Tests are two-tailed (*:p ≤ 0.05,**:p ≤ 0.01).
H0: the medians are equal.
The tests reported in the last two columns of Table 2 again take into
account randomness of the data by adding a normally distributed random
variable with mean zero and variance SEE2j to the respective differences,
where SEEj is the standard estimation error of estimating the benefit func-
tion of subject j. The test results are summarized in Table 3. 35% of
subjects contributed significantly more than their respective Lindahl contri-
bution. Further 16% contributed an amount not significantly different from
the optimum and more than in the Nash equilibrium. For 12 subjects we
could reject neither the Lindahl nor the Nash equilibrium. These subjects
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are interpreted as contributing between Nash equilibrium and social opti-
mum, including both. 19% of subjects contributed the Nash equilibrium
benchmark and less than optimal. There was only one subject contributing
even less than in the Nash equilibrium.
Summarizing this subsection, the individual analysis (using only the data
from the IncrMC treatment) supports the group-level analysis, where group
contributions slightly exceeded the optimum contributions according to the
Samuelson condition. Here, more than half of the subjects contribute at
least as much as their theoretical optimum value and more than according
to the Nash equilibrium benchmark. It should be noted, however, that for
most subjects (the 95% interval estimate of) the Lindahl equilibrium failed
to predict their individual contributions.
Table 3 Summary of Individual Results—
IncrMC Treatment
n %
>opt & >Nash 15 35
=opt & >Nash 7 16
=opt & =Nash 12 28
<opt & =Nash 8 19
<opt & <Nash 1 2
Sum 43 100
3.3 Can Private Goods Valuations Serve as Proxies for
Public Preferences?
Despite the fact that the voluntary contributions of 24 subjects (see Table
3) differ significantly from the Lindahl predictions, we find a significant posi-
tive correlation between both quantities: Pearson’s correlation coefficient be-
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tween the subjects’ optimal and actual contributions is ρ = 0.452 (p = 0.002,
N = 43). On the contrary, the correlation between the actual contributions
and the predicted Nash contributions is only ρ = 0.13 (p = 0.384, N = 43).
This result suggests that our approach to predict public goods preferences
(in terms of the contributions to public waiting time reduction) from re-
vealed private goods preferences (in terms of their WTP) is reasonable for
the IncrMC treatment.
For the ConstMC treatment we cannot compute this correlation coeffi-
cient, because the estimated WTP functions of many subjects do not exhibit
a strictly concave shape (see Subsection 2.5 above). Therefore, we take an
alternative approach to testing the hypothesis that private goods valuations
can serve as proxies for public goods preferences. Instead of using the WTP
functions, we directly compute the correlation of the original bid data from
the second price auction and the voluntary contributions from the public
goods game. Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the hourly bids and
the contributions is ρ = 0.315 (p = 0.037, N = 44); for the IncrMC treat-
ment, it is ρ = 0.491 (p = 0.001, N = 43), reassuring us on the prior
conclusion for both treatments.18
Since the observed correlation is far from being perfect, i.e., ρ  1,
it is indicated that private good valuations alone do not determine public
good valuations. Apart from the standard free-riding incentives, the recent
literature on other regarding preferences, such as reciprocity and altruism
(see Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003; and Sobel, 2005), has offered
some clues on additional determinants of public goods preferences.
18The significant positive correlation is present also with the other bids for t =
{45, 30, 15} in both treatments.
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4 Conclusion
We have reported the results of a laboratory study in which subjects were
endowed with money and waiting time. Preferences for waiting-time reduc-
tion were elicited with salient rewards both as a private good by means of a
second-price auction and as a public good in the scope of a public goods game.
The allocations of group waiting-time reduction that were theoretically pre-
dicted by the Nash equilibrium and the Lindahl equilibrium, respectively,
were computed from the individual private good valuations and compared
with the subjects’ actual voluntary contributions.
A surprising result of our experiment is that, at the group level, voluntary
contributions to public waiting-time reduction are in line with or even exceed
the social optimum described by the Samuelson condition. This contradicts
Samuelson’s (1954) conjecture that it would be impossible to implement the
Lindahl (1919) equilibrium by voluntary contributions due to free-riding in-
centives. Note that overcontribution generated welfare losses comparable in
size to Nash behavior. At the individual level, however, the evidence was
mixed. For about the same number of individuals observed voluntary con-
tributions fitted either the Lindahl prediction or the Nash prediction better.
The result, nevertheless, is in line with earlier experimental results on public
goods, which generally show that people do not respond to the free-riding
incentives as much as surmised by the theoretical literature (see, e.g., Laury
and Holt, 2008, for a survey). Our conclusions are in line with Smith (1980)
who also confirms the Lindahl allocation at the group level for the provision
of public goods in his experimental study, but at the same time rejects the
Lindahl solution as a descriptive model of individual economic behavior (see
also Bohm, 1972). It should be noted that Samuelson (1954, p. 389) himself
concluded that the traditional economics approach to public good valuation
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might be too simple and that the “sociology” of public goods should be
explored in future research.
We have also presented evidence that revealed private good preferences (in
terms of WTP for individual waiting-time reduction) and public good prefer-
ences (in terms of voluntary contributions to public waiting-time reduction)
exhibit a significant positive correlation, but with the qualification that the
correlation is distinctly lower than one. Hence, the private good valuation
of waiting-time reduction is only an imperfect indicator of the public good
valuation. We believe that the discrepancy between theory and observed
behavior arises from the assumption that people maximize their own benefit
regardless of other people’s consumption or preferences. An overwhelming
number of experimental studies has shown that this assumption is inaccu-
rate in the presence of public goods (Ledyard, 1995). Revealed public-goods
preferences in experiments are heterogeneous and generally indicate a devi-
ation from pure self-interest. Since the Lindahl benchmark based on private
good valuations, like the Nash benchmark, disregards other regarding pref-
erences it cannot be a complete descriptive model of voluntary contribution
decisions.
Our experimental evidence was obtained in a non-induced value frame-
work, where the public good was waiting-time reduction and the private
good was money. We believe that our experiment is a rather accurate test
of Samuelson’s (1954) pure theory of public expenditure that complements
the extensive literature on public good valuation based on the voluntary
contribution mechanism. As our experimental design admittedly involved a
number of challenges such as the proper elicitation of private good valuations
and their conversion into theoretical predictions for the public good valua-
tions, we also hope to stimulate methodological advancements and future
27
research using the non-induced value framework by our study.
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Appendix
A Instructions
First Part
The experiment will be run on 2 days: today and next week at the same time.
To make sure that we will be able to identify you in the next session, you find
your personal ID card with a number at your place. Please take it with you
and bring it along to the next session. If you participate in both sessions,
following the experimental instructions, you will earn a reasonable amount
of money. You will be paid the earnings of both sessions in private after the
second session. Unless you reveal how much you have earned, no–one will
get to know.
You receive 15 Euros for participating in today’s session. In return you
have to wait 1 hour under supervision. During this time you must be quiet.
You are neither allowed to communicate with the other participants nor to
do anything else (not even sleeping!). You will be supervised and it will
be ensured that you stick to the rules. If you cannot, you will be excluded
from the second session and you will not receive any payment. The strict
compliance with these conditions is indispensable!
The lecture hall I 301 on the second floor of the building, to which you
will be guided shortly, is reserved for the waiting task. Your seat in the
waiting room is labeled with your personal ID. You can leave as soon as the
supervisor informs you about the end of your waiting time.
There exists a possibility to reduce your personal waiting time by pay-
ment. For this purpose you will take part in 4 auctions. The offered waiting
time reductions are as follows:
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1. auction: 60 minutes waiting time reduction (remaining waiting time: 0
minutes)
2. auction: 45 minutes waiting time reduction (remaining waiting time:
15 minutes)
3. auction: 30 minutes waiting time reduction (remaining waiting time:
30 minutes)
4. auction: 15 minutes waiting time reduction (remaining waiting time:
45 minutes)
Note: the order of the bids on your record sheet is reverse!
The auctions proceed according to the following principles:
1. Each participant submits 4 bids simultaneously and anonymously, which
represent the willingness–to–pay for the waiting time reductions, re-
spectively. The bids must be submitted in Euros on your record sheet
WITH indication of the Cents as decimal places behind the dot.
PLEASE USE THIS FORMAT!
2. All bids must be above or at e 0.00, and should not exceed e 15.00!
Furthermore, the bids should not decrease from one auction to the next.
3. Once all participants have submitted their bids, the bids for the 1. auc-
tion will be compared. The participant who has submitted the highest
bid wins the 1. auction and will be excluded from all remaining auc-
tions. Thereafter, the remaining participants’ bids will be compared in
the 2. auction, next those for the 3. and for the 4. The one with the
highest bid, respectively, wins the auction and his or her bids will not
be considered in the following auctions.
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4. If more than one participant has submitted the highest bid in an auction
the winner will be selected (among them) by chance.
5. The auction winner will be charged the highest bid of the remaining
participants (his or her own excluded), i.e., it will be taken off the 15
Euro participation fee.
An example: assume the following three bids (ordered by
size) are the highest ones submitted in an auction:
x Euros,
y Euros,
z Euros, . . . (x ≥ y ≥ z)
The highest bid equals x Euros, the second highest bid equals
y Euros, etc. The participant who has submitted x Euros
wins the auction. The price the participant has to pay equals
y Euros.
6. The participant who has won 60 minutes of waiting time reduction
can leave the waiting room immediately after having entered it. The
participant who has won 45 minutes of waiting time reduction can
leave after waiting 15 minutes. The auction winners of the 30 and 15
minutes’ waiting time reductions can leave after 30 and 45 minutes,
respectively. They will be informed at the end of their waiting time.
The participants without waiting time reduction must wait the entire
60 minutes.
In next week’s session you will receive new instructions for the second part
of the experiment in which you can earn another 15 Euros. Please arrive
on time, otherwise we cannot ensure your participation. You are going to
test now a 5 minutes’ waiting time. The same conditions hold as later, i.e.,
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you are neither allowed to communicate with other participants nor to do
anything else. The test will help you with your decision. The test is thought
to help to find your decision.
ID: . . . . .(Please, submit your bids with decimal places behind the dot!)
My bid for 15 minutes waiting time reduction (remaining waiting time:
45 minutes) . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .
My bid for 30 minutes waiting time reduction (remaining waiting time:
30 minutes) . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .
My bid for 45 minutes waiting time reduction (remaining waiting time:
15 minutes) . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .
My bid for 60 minutes waiting time reduction (remaining waiting time:
0 minutes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Second Part
In today’s session you are again endowed with 15 Euros. In return you have
to wait 1 hour under supervision. During this time you must be quiet. You
are neither allowed to communicate with the other participants nor to do
anything else (not even sleeping!). You will be supervised and it will be
ensured that you stick to the rules. If you cannot, you will not receive any
payment. This includes the money you already earned! The strict compliance
with these conditions is indispensable!
The lecture hall I 301 on the second floor of the building, to which you
will be guided shortly, is reserved for the waiting task. Your seats in the
waiting room are numbered with your personal ID. You can leave as soon as
the supervisor informs you about the end of your waiting time.
There exists a possibility to reduce your personal waiting time by pay-
ment. You make your decision about waiting time reduction alone. Yet, your
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decision affects the waiting time of other participants as well. At the same
time your waiting time depends also on the decision of the others.
You form a group of 4 participants with 3 others. The identity of the
group members is determined by chance during the experiment, and will not
be revealed to you.
All participants decide simultaneously and anonymously how much you
want to spend on reduction of the group’s waiting time. Please write the
amount you want to spend in Euros with Cent as decimal places on your
record sheet. PLEASE USE THIS FORMAT, AND DO NOT FORGET TO
INCLUDE YOUR PERSONAL ID! The amounts must be at or above e 0.00
and should not exceed e 15.00!
The sum your group spends on waiting time reduction determines the
group’s waiting time. You can read the waiting time reduction from the
table on the adjoined sheet for all possible amounts the group might spend;
every Cent will be taken into account correspondingly.
If your group spends e 30 or more, your waiting time reduction will be
60 minutes. If your group spends more than e 30, the exceeding amount will
be rebated to you proportionally to your expenditure: If your share of the
group’s expenditure is x% you will receive a rebate of x% of the surplus.
The rest of the money you do not spend on waiting time reduction is
your personal earning in today’s experiment. As soon as every participant
has submitted the record sheet the group’s waiting time will be calculated.
Thereafter, you will be told the result in private.
If your waiting time reduction is 60 minutes, you can leave the waiting
room as soon as you have entered it. If your waiting time reduction is less
than 60 minutes, you will have to wait the time that remains.
As soon as you have been informed about the end of your waiting time,
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please go to the supervisor to collect your personal receipt. Please fill in your
name and sign it! Hand in your receipt at the staff room (room 044) where
you will be paid in cash for your earnings from both experimental sessions.
ID: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
My expenditure for the group’s waiting time reduction is e . . . . . , . . . . .
(Please, submit your amount with the decimal places behind the dot!)
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B Cost Tables
ConstMC Treatment
From the table you can read the waiting time reduction on the left, the
remaining waiting time and the group’s expenditure in Euro on the right, re-
spectively. The sum of your personal expenditure and the ones of the other
3 group members defines the group’s expenditure. If the group’s expenditure
exceeds e 30.00 the surplus will be rebated proportionally to your expendi-
ture: Given your share of group expenditure is x% you will receive x% of the
surplus. Your personal expenditure must not exceed e 15.00.
Waiting time
reduction
Remaining
waiting time
Group’s ex-
penditure
Waiting time
reduction
Remaining
waiting time
Group’s ex-
penditure
0 Min 60 Min e 0.00 31 Min 29 Min e 15.50
1 Min 59 Min e 0.50 32 Min 28 Min e 16.00
2 Min 58 Min e 1.00 33 Min 27 Min e 16.50
3 Min 57 Min e 1.50 34 Min 26 Min e 17.00
4 Min 56 Min e 2.00 35 Min 25 Min e 17.50
5 Min 55 Min e 2.50 36 Min 24 Min e 18.00
6 Min 54 Min e 3.00 37 Min 23 Min e 18.50
7 Min 53 Min e 3.50 38 Min 22 Min e 19.00
8 Min 52 Min e 4.00 39 Min 21 Min e 19.50
9 Min 51 Min e 4.50 40 Min 20 Min e 20.00
10 Min 50 Min e 5.00 41 Min 19 Min e 20.50
11 Min 49 Min e 5.50 42 Min 18 Min e 21.00
12 Min 48 Min e 6.00 43 Min 17 Min e 21.50
13 Min 47 Min e 6.50 44 Min 16 Min e 22.00
14 Min 46 Min e 7.00 45 Min 15 Min e 22.50
15 Min 45 Min e 7.50 46 Min 14 Min e 23.00
16 Min 44 Min e 8.00 47 Min 13 Min e 23.50
17 Min 43 Min e 8.50 48 Min 12 Min e 24.00
18 Min 42 Min e 9.00 49 Min 11 Min e 24.50
19 Min 41 Min e 9.50 50 Min 10 Min e 25.00
20 Min 40 Min e 10.00 51 Min 9 Min e 25.50
21 Min 39 Min e 10.50 52 Min 8 Min e 26.00
22 Min 38 Min e 11.00 53 Min 7 Min e 26.50
23 Min 37 Min e 11.50 54 Min 6 Min e 27.00
24 Min 36 Min e 12.00 55 Min 5 Min e 27.50
25 Min 35 Min e 12.50 56 Min 4 Min e 28.00
26 Min 34 Min e 13.00 57 Min 3 Min e 28.50
27 Min 33 Min e 13.50 58 Min 2 Min e 29.00
28 Min 32 Min e 14.00 59 Min 1 Min e 29.50
29 Min 31 Min e 14.50 60 Min 0 Min e 30.00
30 Min 30 Min e 15.00 60 Min 0 Min >e 30.00
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IncrMC Treatment
From the table you can read the waiting time reduction on the left, the
remaining waiting time and the group’s expenditure in Euro on the right, re-
spectively. The sum of your personal expenditure and the ones of the other
3 group members defines the group’s expenditure. If the group’s expenditure
exceeds e 30.00 the surplus will be rebated proportionally to your expendi-
ture: Given your share of group expenditure is x% you will receive x% of the
surplus. Your personal expenditure must not exceed e 15.00.
Waiting time
reduction
Remaining
waiting time
Group’s ex-
penditure
Waiting time
reduction
Remaining
waiting time
Group’s ex-
penditure
0 Min 60 Min e 0.00 31 Min 29 Min e 8.13
1 Min 59 Min e 0.02 32 Min 28 Min e 8.66
2 Min 58 Min e 0.05 33 Min 27 Min e 9.20
3 Min 57 Min e 0.10 34 Min 26 Min e 9.75
4 Min 56 Min e 0.16 35 Min 25 Min e 10.33
5 Min 55 Min e 0.25 36 Min 24 Min e 10.92
6 Min 54 Min e 0.34 37 Min 23 Min e 11.52
7 Min 53 Min e 0.46 38 Min 22 Min e 12.15
8 Min 52 Min e 0.59 39 Min 21 Min e 12.79
9 Min 51 Min e 0.74 40 Min 20 Min e 13.44
10 Min 50 Min e 0.90 41 Min 19 Min e 14.11
11 Min 49 Min e 1.08 42 Min 18 Min e 14.80
12 Min 48 Min e 1.28 43 Min 17 Min e 15.51
13 Min 47 Min e 1.49 44 Min 16 Min e 16.23
14 Min 46 Min e 1.72 45 Min 15 Min e 16.97
15 Min 45 Min e 1.97 46 Min 14 Min e 17.72
16 Min 44 Min e 2.23 47 Min 13 Min e 18.49
17 Min 43 Min e 2.51 48 Min 12 Min e 19.28
18 Min 42 Min e 2.80 49 Min 11 Min e 20.08
19 Min 41 Min e 3.11 50 Min 10 Min e 20.90
20 Min 40 Min e 3.44 51 Min 9 Min e 21.74
21 Min 39 Min e 3.79 52 Min 8 Min e 22.59
22 Min 38 Min e 4.15 53 Min 7 Min e 23.46
23 Min 37 Min e 4.52 54 Min 6 Min e 24.34
24 Min 36 Min e 4.92 55 Min 5 Min e 25.25
25 Min 35 Min e 5.33 56 Min 4 Min e 26.16
26 Min 34 Min e 5.75 57 Min 3 Min e 27.10
27 Min 33 Min e 6.20 58 Min 2 Min e 28.05
28 Min 32 Min e 6.66 59 Min 1 Min e 29.02
29 Min 31 Min e 7.13 60 Min 0 Min e 30.00
30 Min 30 Min e 7.62 60 Min 0 Min >e 30.00
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